Abstract. An unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is proposed in this paper. we show that this scheme is statistically binding and perfectly concealing. The security of the protocol is based on the existence of quantum one-way functions by fundamental principles of quantum physics. As a conclusion of this paper, statistically binding and perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment schemes can be constructed based on any of this family of quantum one-way functions.
Introduction
A bit commitment protocol involves two parties, a sender called Alice and a receiver called Bob. Suppose that Alice has in mind a bit which she would like to commit to Bob. That is, Alice commits a value to Bob so that she can't change it at a later time. For Bob, at this time, he shouldn't be able to know the committed bit, but can reveal it later at a right time.
Various quantum bit commitment schemes [1] (QBC) have been proposed and BCJL [2] bit commitment scheme has been claimed to be provably unbreakable. Unfortunately, it was shown independently by Mayers [3] , Lo and Chau [4, 5] that all proposed QBC schemes are insecure because the sender Alice can always cheat successfully by so-called EPR attack and delay her measurement until her opening the commitment. The failure of quantum bit commitment is a great surprise and a big lesson for quantum cryptography. it is possible to construct computationally secure quantum bit commitment scheme based on quantum one-way permutation [6] . The resulting scheme still requires the computational assumption as in the classical case. In this paper, we show that the unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment schemes exist under any quantum one-way function which is based on quantum mechanics, but not based on computational assumption . We show that the protocol is a statistically binding and perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment scheme. This paper is arranged as below: Section 2 introduces the BB84 quantum bit commitment scheme and presents why it is insecure under quantum attack. Section 3 presents a quantum bit commitment scheme, the security of which is based on the fundamental principles of quantum physics. The binding and concealing properties are studied in section 4 and 5. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
Quantum Bit Commitment

Definitions
A bit commitment scheme consists of a commit phase and a reveal phase, in which the sender can commit itself to a value such that the following requirements are satisfied.
1. Concealing condition: At the end of the first phase, the receiver Bob doesn't gain any knowledge of the sender's value. This requirement has to be satisfied even if the receiver tries to cheat.
2. Binding condition: Given the transcript of the interaction in the first phase, there exists at most one value that Bob can later accept as a legal opening of the commitment. This requirement has to be satisfied even if the sender tries to cheat.
When speaking of cheating for bit commitment protocols, both participants can be malevolent. The sender Alice intends to make empty commitment and can alter the value of the committed bit later, while the receiver Bob wants to know the bit before he should do.
For quantum bit commitment model, a system H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C is included, where H A , H B correspond to Alice and Bob's Hilbert space respectively and H E corresponds to the environment. Alice and Bob can perform any unitary transformation on their respective systems. They can also introduce new registers, say ancillary registers, in an initial state |0 . Alice and Bob could perform measurements on the quantum state. Suppose that a qubit in state |ψ = α|0 + β|1 is measured according to the {|0 , |1 } basis. To execute a binary outcome measurement, a participant (Alice or Bob) introduces a quantum register in the state |0 and performs a unitary transformation as
Then she (he) sends the second quantum register to a measuring apparatus and outputs the measurement result |ϕ 0 or |ϕ 1 , from which we can deduce that the qubit is in state |0 or |1 . It happens with probability |α| 2 that the measuring result is |0 and |β| 2 that the measuring result is |1 .
BB84 QBC Scheme
The first quantum bit commitment scheme ever proposed is due to Bennett and Brassard [8] , which is called BB84 QBC protocol and presented as below.
Commit phase Alice chooses n random classical data bits ω = ω 1 , · · · , ω n . Then she encodes each bit ω i using θ = Z basis {|0 , |1 } if she wants to commit a b = 0 and θ = X basis {|± = (|0 ± |1 )/ √ 2} if she wants to commit a b = 1. She sends these encoded qubits to Bob. Then, Bob selects a string of random basesθ =θ 1 · · ·θ n ∈ {Z, X} n and measures the register i in the basisθ i and notes the outcomeω i .
Reveal phase Alice announces the bit string ω. Bob can determine θ by looking at the positions i where ω i =ω i , because ω i =ω i means θ =θ i . If two such positions reveal different values for θ, then he knows that Alice is cheating. Alice's any deceiving must guess exactly the bits obtained by Bob whenθ i = θ. Thus the protocol is binding because these bits obtained by Bob are perfectly random. The scheme is concealing because both the committed bit b = 0 and b = 1 correspond to the same mixed density matrix on Bob's side.
EPR-based Quantum Attack
Here presents a method allow Alice to cheat. In the commit phase, Alice can prepare the quantum bits encoded in θ basis W θ = (|0 0|+ |1 1|) (θ) / √ 2 instead of each bit ω i . She sends the second half of these qubits to Bob and Bob measures the states in a string of random basisθ =θ 1 · · ·θ n . For qubits withθ i = θ,the qubits on Alice's side becomes |ω i θ . Now, in the modified reveal phase, Alice can measure this qubit in the basis of her choice and send the result to Bob. It can be easily verified that this result will be the same as what Alice would have sent if she had followed the honest protocol in the original commit phase. More general attack on quantum bit commitment scheme can refer to Ref. [3, 4] .
The schemes
Quantum one-way function
In this scheme, we use a class of quantum one-way functions based on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, which are introduced by Gottesman and Chuang [9] and the definitions are presented as below. What should point out for the above definition is that the condition n 1 ≫ n 2 is necessary. By Holevo's theorem [10] , no more than n classical bits of information can be obtained by measuring n qubits quantum states. Several means to construct quantum one-way function were introduced by Gottesman and Chuang [9] and here we choose the quantum fingerprinting function [11] for the candidate. The quantum fingerprinting function of a bit string u ∈ F n 2 is
where E : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is an error correcting code with fixed c > 1, 0 < δ < 1 and m = cn. E l (u) denotes the lth bit of E(u). The distance between distinct code words E(u 1 ) and E(u 2 ) is at least (1 − δ)m. Since two distinct code words can be equal in at most δm positions, for any u 1 = u 2 we have f (u 1 )|f (u 2 ) ≤ δm/m = δ. Here f (u) can be regarded as a family of quantum one-way functions, which are easy to compute, but difficult to reverse.
Quantum bit commitment scheme
Commit phase
1. Alice generates 2k random secret strings u i,j ∈ F n 2 and computes
Here f : |x → |f (x) is a class of quantum one-way functions introduced in section 3.1. Now, Alice has 2k key pairs {u i,j , |y i,j } 1≤j≤k j∈{0,1}
and computes |A according to her quantum message |x
2. Alice sends |A and |x θ(ω) ∈ H Commit to Bob. Here ω is the committed bit, θ(ω) = Z when ω = 0 and θ(ω) = X when ω = 1.
Reveal phase 1. Alice announces ω and her keys {u i,j } 1≤j≤k j∈{0,1} to Bob, 2. Bob measures |x θ(ω) according to ω and obtains k classical bits x, 3. Bob compares |f (u i,x i ) with |a i for each pair {|a i , u i,x i } by using a so-called quantum swap test circuit (QSTC [11] ). Bob accepts ω if and only if |f (u i,x i ) = |a i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The Concealing property
In a bit commitment scheme, concealing means that the receiver Bob can't obtain more than a negligible amount of information about the bit committed by Alice. We say that a scheme is perfectly concealing if the receiver cannot gain any information about the committed bit. It can be easily verified that our protocol is perfectly concealing. Proof. Suppose ρ ω for ω ∈ {0, 1} be the density matrix corresponding to the state sent by Alice when the bit ω is committed. The density matrix corresponding to Z basis and X basis can be expressed as
The protocol is perfectly concealing because the quantum states ρ 0 and ρ 1 are same and no information about the transformation basis can be obtained from any bit |x i . The theorem follows that no quantum measurement can distinguish between two processes that output the same density matrix.
The Binding Property
We say that a protocol is binding if Alice can't open both 0 and 1 with non-negligible probability of success. Here we consider the general quantum attack against the binding condition of this scheme. As noted by Dumais, Mayers, Salvail [6] , in the classical world, one can always fix the adversary's committed bit by fixing the content of his random tape, then we can require that either the probability to open 0 or the probability to open 1 vanish for every fixed value of the random tape. In quantum case, however, the committer can still introduce randomness even if we fix the random tape. 
where τ (k) is negligible.
Proof. Here we present two strategies that a dishonest Alice can apply. One is that she constructs a state entangled with some state that she holds and the other is that she doesn't introduce quantum superposition state entangled with her kept register.
(1) In the first case, Alice prepares 2k key pairs {u i,j , |y i,j } 1≤j≤k j∈{0,1}
and computes |A following the honest protocol. Then Alice can generate k entangled states encoded in θ basis as
where θ ∈ {Z, X}. Alice keeps the first k qubits register and sends |A and the second k qubits register as a committed register |x ′ encoded in θ basis to Bob. Now Alice has two ways to go. First, she does nothing on her kept qubits and randomly selects a bit ω and commits it to Bob. Bob measures his register |x ′ according to ω. He measures the state in Z basis if ω = 0 and measures the state in X basis if ω = 1. Then Bob checks that if |f (u i,x i ) = |a i for each pair (u i,x i , |a i ) using the quantum swap test circuit proposed in Ref. [11] . For this case, the probability that Bob obtains the same classical bit as the original x is at most 1 2 k . What should also be considered is the error probability introduced by the quantum swap test circuit. The quantum swap test circuit has the following properties: the swap test is always passed and outputs with |1 if |f (u i,x i ) = |a i . If the inequation f (u i,x i )|a i ≤ δ holds , the measurement result |1 happens with probability at most (1 + δ 2 )/2. The idea is that an equality test exists, but fails with nonzero probability. Because there are k qubits to compare, so the error probability of the test can be reduced to ( 1+δ 2 2 ) k and k is the security parameter. (2) If Alice doesn't introduce superposition states entangled with her kept register, then she has no quantum register correlated with the state on Bob's side and whatever she does on her state, such as measurement or local unitary operation, will have no effects on the committed state. So she can't cheat in that case.
Conclusion
In this article, we present an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol that is statistically binding and perfectly concealing. The security of this scheme is based on the existence of quantum one-way functions based on quantum properties, which is different from the quantum one-way functions based on computational assumption utilized by Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [6] . We also conclude that, based on any family of quantum physical one-way
